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INTRODUCTION

Don Jones represented himself at trial, but he didn’t really
1
want to. His public defender applications were denied, and he
2
didn’t hire a private attorney. A divided Minnesota Supreme
Court determined that Jones forfeited his right to counsel based on
his “extremely dilatory” conduct in failing to retain counsel, despite
3
being given many opportunities to do so. The problem with the
Jones decision is that forfeiture of fundamental constitutional rights
is usually reserved for more serious misconduct—for example,
threatening or abusive behavior, or deliberate wrongdoing—not
4
the type of conduct at issue in Jones.
The goal of this note is to provide lawyers and judges with
some guidelines to consider in assessing whether a defendant’s
behavior is bad enough to result in the loss of the fundamental
constitutional right to counsel. With that goal in mind, this note
will first discuss the requirements for a constitutionally valid waiver
of counsel, define the terms “waiver by conduct” and “forfeiture”
5
that the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on in Jones, and explore
United States Supreme Court decisions that have found that a
defendant can forfeit fundamental constitutional rights based on
6
wrongdoing. Next, this note will discuss the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s decision in Jones and analyze whether Jones’s conduct was
7
bad enough to result in forfeiture of the right to counsel. Finally,
this note will provide guidelines to help lawyers and judges
determine when a defendant’s behavior is bad enough to forfeit
8
the right to counsel.

1. See State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2009) (Jones applied for a
public defender four or five times but was denied and was unable to retain counsel
on his own), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 3275 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 501.
4. Id. at 514 (Meyer, J., and Anderson, Paul, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1101–02 (3d Cir. 1995)).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
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II. DEFINITION OF TERMS—WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR WAIVER,
WAIVER BY CONDUCT, AND FORFEITURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS?
In holding that Jones forfeited his right to counsel, the
Minnesota Supreme Court discussed the concepts of waiver, waiver
9
by conduct, and forfeiture. Because these concepts have not been
10
universally adopted, it is important to define them.
A. Waiver
While a defendant can waive the right to counsel, the trial
court is responsible for ensuring that the waiver complies with the
federal constitution and state law.
1.

Constitutional Requirements

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental
11
constitutional right.
The Sixth Amendment “is one of the
safeguards . . . necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life
12
and liberty.” Further, the Sixth Amendment “embodies a realistic
recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does
not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty,
wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned
13
counsel.”
14
Although the right to counsel is a fundamental right, Faretta
v. California established that a criminal defendant is also afforded
the concomitant right to waive counsel and represent himself at
15
trial. Nonetheless, as with other fundamental rights, the Supreme
Court consistently guards the defendant’s fundamental right to
counsel by “indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against
9. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504–06.
10. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 895 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part) (noting that courts use the terms waiver and forfeiture
interchangeably, although the “two are really not the same . . .”); State v.
Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 548 (Tenn. 2000)(citing United States v. Goldberg, 67
F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995)(noting that some courts uses these terms
interchangeably).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
12. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
13. Id. at 462–63.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
15. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
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16

waiver . . . .” Further, the Supreme Court “do[es] not presume
17
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” Accordingly, a
waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
18
known right or privilege.”
When a defendant waives a
fundamental right, the trial judge has the responsibility of ensuring
19
that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
In determining whether the defendant’s waiver of counsel
meets these requirements, the trial court must, at a minimum,
ensure that the defendant has enough information to make an
20
intelligent choice.
This includes warnings of the hazards and
pitfalls of proceeding to trial uncounseled, as well as ensuring that
the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the range
of allowable punishments, so that the record establishes that he
21
“knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
These warnings will be referred to throughout this article as “Faretta
warnings.”
Further, in exercising its duty of ensuring that the defendant’s
waiver of counsel is competent and intelligent, the trial court
22
should make this determination on the record.
Finally, the
determination of whether the defendant intelligently waived the
right to counsel depends “upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
23
experience, and conduct of the accused.”

16. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (“But waiver requires not merely
comprehension but relinquishment . . . .”).
17. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993) (discussing
competency required to waive counsel); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482
(1981) (discussing waiver of counsel as it relates to the voluntariness of a
confession).
20. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; see also Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88–89 (2004)
(citations omitted) (discussing the difference between the information the
defendant must possess to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel
before deciding to represent himself at trial and the information the defendant
must possess at other earlier stages of the proceedings, such as when entering a
guilty plea).
21. See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465.
23. Id.
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Minnesota Law

Consistent with these principles, Minnesota law explicitly
requires that a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel be in
24
writing. However, if the defendant refuses to sign the waiver, the
25
waiver must be on the record. And before the court can accept
the waiver, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require the
courts to advise defendants of the following:
(a) nature of the charges;
(b) all offenses included within the charges;
(c) range of allowable punishments;
(d) there may be defenses;
(e) mitigating circumstances may exist; and
(f) all other facts essential to a broad understanding of
the consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel,
including the advantages and disadvantages of the
26
decision to waive counsel.
Although Minnesota law explicitly provides that the
defendant’s waiver of counsel must be in writing or on the record,
the district court did not have Jones sign a written waiver of
counsel. The on-the-record waiver was insufficient because it did
not include the nature of the charges or the dangers and
27
disadvantages of waiving counsel.
B. Waiver by Conduct
Although Jones’s waiver of counsel did not comply with Faretta
28
or Minnesota law, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered
29
The
whether the waiver was valid under a different theory.
supreme court relied on the concepts of waiver by conduct and
24. MINN. STAT. § 611.19 (2010); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4).
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.04 was previously numbered Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.02, but it has not substantively changed.
25. MINN. STAT. § 611.19.
26. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4). These requirements are consistent
with the minimum requirements necessary to ensure that the waiver of counsel is
knowing and intelligent, particularly the requirement that the defendant “be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record establishes that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open.’” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United
States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
27. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009).
28. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 611.19; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807.
29. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 506.
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forfeiture as discussed by the Third Circuit in United States v.
30
Goldberg. According to the Goldberg definitions, waiver by conduct
is a hybrid situation that combines elements of waiver and
forfeiture: “[o]nce a defendant has been warned that he will lose
his attorney if he engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct
thereafter may be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se
31
and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel.”
However, the
defendant must also be advised of the dangers and disadvantages of
32
self-representation, as required by Faretta. Accordingly, waiver by
conduct only applies where the defendant is aware of the
consequences of his actions, including the risks of self33
representation.
In jurisdictions that follow the Goldberg definition of waiver by
34
conduct, courts have found that the defendant waives counsel by
unreasonable or uncooperative conduct that sabotages the
relationship with counsel or repeatedly failing to retain counsel
where the record is clear that the defendant had the demonstrated
35
financial ability to retain counsel. On the other hand, where the
30. 67 F.3d 1092, 1099–1102 (3d Cir. 1995).
31. Id. at 1100 (citations omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1103 (noting that any claim that Goldberg waived counsel by his
conduct is precluded by the government’s concession that the district court failed
to inform him of the risks of self-representation in accordance with Faretta).
34. Id. at 1100.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the defendant can waive the right to counsel by conduct in being
uncooperative and rejecting appointed counsel where the defendant understands
that his only alternative is self-representation with its “many attendant dangers”);
United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
defendant waived counsel by conduct where he was warned of the disadvantages of
self-representation but he deliberately sabotaged his relationship with six different
appointed attorneys causing a twenty-month delay in scheduling the trial); King v.
Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 488, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding defendant waived
counsel by his conduct when he refused to retain an attorney despite his financial
ability to do so, refused to work with his attorney, and the defendant was aware of
the disadvantages of self-representation); United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 672
(7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant impliedly waived counsel by his
conduct where he had two different court-appointed lawyers; the defendant found
them unsatisfactory; the court gave him the choice of staying with the courtappointed lawyer, retaining his own lawyer, or representing himself, and the
defendant appeared at trial without a lawyer; and the court’s warnings about the
dangers of self-representation, although perfunctory, were adequate); United
States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the “combination
of ability to pay for counsel plus refusal to do so does waive the right to counsel at
trial” where the defendant was warned about the dangers of self-representation);
United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166–67 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding waiver
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record does not indicate that the defendant had the financial ability
to retain counsel and the court failed to warn the defendant of the
dangers of self-representation, courts have held that waiver by
36
conduct does not apply. The Minnesota Supreme Court found
that waiver by conduct did not apply to Jones’s case because he was
never warned of the dangers and disadvantages of self37
representation.
C. Forfeiture
According to the Goldberg definitions, forfeiture does not
require any advance warnings and “results in the loss of a right
regardless of the defendant’s knowledge thereof and irrespective of
38
whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right.” Because
forfeiture is a severe sanction, the defendant’s misconduct must be
39
“extremely dilatory” or “extremely serious.”
Examples of
“extremely serious” or “extremely dilatory” misconduct include
40
assaulting counsel, verbally abusing or threatening counsel, and
egregious manipulation (for example, making unreasonable
demands of counsel or unreasonably discharging counsel for the

by conduct based on the defendant’s stubborn failure to retain counsel where he
had the financial ability to do so, but was refusing to do so unless he found
counsel who agreed with his views about the invalidity of the tax laws, and he was
repeatedly warned by the court of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
that the defendant did not waive counsel where the defendant’s court-appointed
counsel was allowed to withdraw, but the court would not allow the defendant to
substitute counsel, leaving him without representation, and the court did not
advise him of the dangers of proceeding pro se); Jackson v. James, 839 F.2d 1513,
1516 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that the defendant did not waive counsel where the
defendant’s court-appointed counsel withdrew, the defendant was not given an
opportunity to obtain a different lawyer, and there was no evidence that the
defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation); State v. Pedockie
137 P.3d 716, 724–26 (Utah 2006) (refusing to find waiver by conduct where the
defendant was not advised of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation).
37. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 505 (Minn. 2009).
38. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100.
39. Id. at 1101–02.
40. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding
that defendant forfeited counsel where he punched the attorney in the head and
scratched and spit on him while he was on the ground); State v. Lehman, 749
N.W.2d 76, 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that the defendant forfeited his
right to counsel by attacking his public defender in open court, causing a cut lip
and black eye).
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purpose of delaying or disrupting the administration of justice).
However, some courts have found forfeiture under far less
serious circumstances, such as when a defendant fails to retain
42
counsel, despite having the financial ability to do so. Nonetheless,
the Third Circuit determined that Goldberg’s conduct was not
sufficiently serious to warrant the extreme sanction of forfeiture,
43
despite the fact that he threatened his attorney’s life.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that Jones’s conduct in
failing to retain counsel after being given several opportunities to
44
do so was “extremely dilatory” as to constitute forfeiture.
United States Supreme Court Decisions on Forfeiture
Although the United States Courts of Appeals and state courts
have determined that a defendant can forfeit the right to counsel
45
by bad behavior, the United States Supreme Court has never
46
considered this issue. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held
41. See United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding
that defendant’s verbal abuse and refusal to cooperate with counsel, including his
attempt to force the attorney to file frivolous claims as he had with his previous
attorneys, constituted forfeiture of the right to counsel); United States v. McLeod,
53 F.3d 322, 325–26 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that forfeiture occurred where
the defendant verbally abused and threatened to sue counsel and demanded that
counsel engage in unethical conduct); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550
(Tenn. 2000) (concluding that defendant’s conduct was “sufficiently egregious” to
constitute forfeiture of counsel where the defendant made unreasonable demands
of counsel and escalating threats for the purpose of sabotaging his relationship
with each successive attorney for the purpose of delaying and disrupting his trial).
42. See Wilkerson v. Klem, 412 F.3d 449, 451, 455–56 (3d Cir. 2005)
(concluding that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel; although the
defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of “extremely serious misconduct,”
the defendant advised the court that his family was retaining counsel for him but
appeared at trial without representation and the public defender acted as standby
counsel); Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 2009)
(concluding that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by failing to retain
counsel despite having the opportunity and financial ability to do so).
43. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102. See also State v. Hampton, 92 P.3d 871, 873–75
(Ariz. 2004) (remanding for the appointment of new counsel despite the fact that
the defendant had twice made death threats against his court-appointed appellate
counsel causing both of them to withdraw from representation).
44. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 505–06 (Minn. 2009).
45. See, e.g., supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
46. See Wilkerson, 412 F.3d at 454–55 (citation omitted) (analyzing a federal
habeas petition, the Third Circuit noted that there were no Supreme Court
decisions involving forfeiture or “providing any clear guidance as to the standard
to be applied” in determining if a defendant’s misconduct warrants forfeiture of
the right to counsel); see also Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100 (“[T]he Supreme Court has
not ruled directly on this issue . . . .”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/8

8

Carlson: State v. Jones and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: When is a Defendant'

2011]

STATE V. JONES

827

that a defendant can forfeit other fundamental constitutional
rights by engaging in wrongdoing that is purposefully directed at
the constitutional right forfeited. Although these decisions do not
involve forfeiture of the right to counsel, they do involve other
Sixth Amendment rights that, like the right to counsel, are
47
“fundamental to the fair administration of American justice.”
Therefore, they provide persuasive authority regarding how courts
should evaluate whether the defendant can be deemed to have
forfeited counsel by his or her bad behavior.
Before analyzing these decisions, it is important to remember
that the Supreme Court “generally disfavor[s] inferred waivers of
48
constitutional rights.”
Nonetheless, the Court has occasionally
recognized that a criminal defendant may impliedly waive or forfeit
49
fundamental constitutional rights by misconduct. However, the
forfeiture of a fundamental constitutional right only applies when
the defendant’s own deliberate actions result in the constitutional
50
violation.
As early as 1878, the Supreme Court recognized that when the
defendant deliberately behaves badly, he cannot claim that his
51
constitutional rights have been violated.
In Reynolds v. United
52
States, the defendant, who was on trial for bigamy, had procured
the absence of one of his wives from testifying against him at trial
by concealing her so that the State was unable to serve her with a
53
subpoena. Reynolds argued that the use of his wife’s testimony
from a prior trial violated his rights under the Confrontation
54
But the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Constitution
Clause.
does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate
55
consequences of his own wrongful acts.”
In other words, the
defendant could not assert that his constitutional right to confront
the witness against him was violated when his own wrongdoing
56
procured her absence from the trial.
47. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (discussing the rights basic
to the adversary system of justice, such as the right to confrontation).
48. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 515 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
49. See id. at 508–10 (holding that there was no error when defendant
willingly went to trial in prison garb).
50. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
51. Id. at 158.
52. 98 U.S. 145.
53. Id. at 159–60.
54. Id. at 158.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 160.
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Thus, with respect to the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the defendant’s wrongdoing in
procuring a witness’s absence can constitute a forfeiture of the
57
fundamental right of confrontation.
But the Supreme Court
58
recently clarified and narrowed this rule in Giles v. California,
holding that the defendant’s wrongdoing must be directly related
to procuring the witness’s absence from trial for the purpose of
59
preventing the witness from testifying.
In Giles, the defendant was on trial for killing his former
60
girlfriend. The State sought to admit evidence of the girlfriend’s
out-of-court statements to a police officer about a prior occasion
61
when Giles assaulted her. Giles asserted that the admission of the
out-of-court statements violated his rights under the Confrontation
62
And the Supreme Court agreed, holding that the
Clause.
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing only applies when the
defendant specifically kills the victim to prevent the victim from
63
testifying against him. Because there was no evidence that Giles
had that specific purpose, the State could not use the victim’s out64
of-court statements at Giles’s murder trial. Put another way, every
murder makes the victim unavailable to testify at trial, so unless the
killing was done for the specific purpose of procuring the victim’s
absence from trial, the defendant does not forfeit his constitutional
right to confrontation by causing the victim’s death.
In some circumstances the Supreme Court has found a loss of
fundamental constitutional rights based on the defendant’s bad
65
66
behavior during the trial. For example, in Illinois v. Allen, the
57. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (holding forfeiture
rule applies to those who procure the silence of witnesses in order to undermine
the integrity of the judicial process).
58. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
59. Id. at 2684.
60. Id. at 2681.
61. Id. at 2681–82.
62. Id. at 2682.
63. Id. at 2687–88.
64. Id. at 2693.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1989)
(removing defendant from court after multiple verbal disruptions); Scurr v.
Moore, 647 F.2d 854, 855 (8th Cir. 1981) (assaulting a jailer during recess and
making obscene outbursts at trial); Jones v. Poole, No. 04 Civ. 0303 (SHS) (THK),
2005 LEXIS 46297, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (communication of
dissatisfaction with appointed counsel to judge and jury and an attempt to spit on
counsel); Russ v. Israel, 531 F. Supp. 490, 492–93 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (pro se
representation “peppered with vulgar remarks”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/8

10

Carlson: State v. Jones and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: When is a Defendant'

2011]

STATE V. JONES

829

Court held the following:
[A] defendant can lose his [Sixth Amendment] right to
be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the
judge that he will be removed if he continues his
disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting
himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and
disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried
67
on with him in the courtroom.
In Allen, the defendant insisted on representing himself, but
the court appointed an advisory counsel to assist him during the
68
trial. During jury selection, the defendant argued with the judge
in an abusive and disrespectful manner; when the court asked the
appointed counsel to continue with the voir dire, the defendant
objected, threw papers on the floor, and threatened to kill the
69
judge. The court warned the defendant that if he continued his
disrespectful conduct, he would be shackled or removed from the
70
trial. The defendant persisted, was removed from the courtroom
for most of the trial, and the advisory counsel conducted his
71
defense in his absence. The Court held that although the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right of confrontation, this right
72
cannot “handicap a trial judge in conducting a criminal trial.”
Accordingly, a criminal defendant can lose his right to be present
at trial based on his disruptive and disrespectful behavior towards
73
the court.
These cases all involve the fundamental Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation. And they share a common theme—the
defendant deliberately engaged in wrongdoing that was directly
related to the constitutional right lost. In other words, these cases
stand for the proposition that a defendant cannot complain about
the loss of constitutional rights when his or her own wrongdoing is
responsible for the loss.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

397 U.S. 337 (1970).
Id. at 343.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 339–40.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 342–43.
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III. THE JONES CASE AND DECISION
The next question is how the Minnesota Supreme Court
applied the concepts of waiver, waiver by conduct, and forfeiture to
the facts in Jones.
A. The Case
Don Jones was charged with three felony offenses: check
74
These
forgery, offering a forged check, and theft by swindle.
offenses arose from the allegation that Jones deposited a forged
payroll check from a closed business account for a towing company
75
he and his girlfriend operated. The check was signed in Jones’s
76
girlfriend’s mother’s name, who denied signing the check. Jones
endorsed the check and used the majority of the proceeds to pay
77
for the down payment on a Lincoln Navigator. The check was
returned because the account was closed, and Jones never repaid
78
the money.
At his initial appearance in court, Jones, unrepresented by
79
counsel, posted bail and told the court that he was “going to get a
80
private attorney.” So the court continued the next court hearing
81
to give him a chance to do so. At the next appearance on May 5,
2006, Jones was unemployed and had not retained counsel, so he
82
applied for a public defender. Jones was living with his sister, his
83
girlfriend, and their one-year-old daughter. Jones’s rent and food

74. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2009), cert. denied sub nom.,
Jones v. Minnesota, 130 S. Ct. 3275 (2010); see MINN. STAT. § 609.52, subdiv. 2(4)
(2008) (defining theft by swindle); Id. § 609.631, subdivs. 2–3 (2008) (laying out
the elements of check forgery).
75. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 500.
76. Id.
77. Appellant’s Brief at 9, State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009) (No.
A07-1168).
78. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 500.
79. Id.
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. See id.
82. Id. Jones applied for a public defender several times. Id. at 508 (Page, J.,
dissenting). However, only two applications were in the district court file. Id.
Both applications are attached to Justice Page’s dissenting opinion. See id. at 510–
13. The State argued that Jones “failed to provide a sufficient record for appellate
review.” Id. at 502 n.1 (majority opinion). But the supreme court disagreed and
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s public
defender applications. Id. at 503.
83. Id. at 500.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/8

12

Carlson: State v. Jones and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: When is a Defendant'

2011]

STATE V. JONES

831

84

were paid by his sister, but he had other debts and expenses—
child support for other children, a car payment, and insurance—
85
totaling between $1384 and $1484 per month. Jones’s girlfriend
86
was employed, earning a monthly income of $2080. Although the
application listed the Lincoln Navigator as an asset, the value of the
87
car was equal to the debt owed.
The words “deny—over
88
guidelines” were written and circled on the application form. The
court recommended that Jones try to retain counsel from the list of
reduced-fee attorneys, and Jones indicated that he could probably
89
hire an attorney in a month. He also acknowledged that he was
probably denied a public defender because of the Lincoln
90
Navigator and he would have to sell it.
On June 9, 2006, Jones appeared in court without counsel and
explained he had applied for the public defender twice but his
applications were denied and none of the reduced-fee attorneys
91
had “worked out for him.” Jones waived his right to an attorney
92
for this appearance. On September 8, 2006, Jones appeared for
93
an omnibus hearing. Jones was unrepresented by counsel but told
the court he was “kind of getting a little stable” and he would
94
contact one of the reduced-fee attorneys.
95
Jones appeared for trial on January 16, 2007, without counsel.
96
He objected to proceeding without counsel. Jones was employed,
and the court told him that his current income would disqualify
97
him from the public defender. Jones had a private attorney on a
different case but stated that he could not afford to have him
98
handle both cases; he reasserted that his public defender
applications had been denied and the reduced-fee lawyer option
84. Id. at 508 (Page, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 500 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 500–01. The Lincoln Navigator, having been purchased with the
proceeds of the allegedly forged check, was repossessed. See Appellant’s Brief,
supra note 77, at 24.
91. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 501.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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99

had also not worked for him. The district court continued the
trial date to February 14, 2007, after confirming with the attorney
representing Jones on the other case that he was waiting for Jones
100
to pay the retainer.
The district court also “acknowledged that
Jones has been doing the things he has to do but just not finalizing
101
them.”
102
Jones appeared at trial on February 14 without counsel. The
court assumed that Jones was choosing to represent himself
because he had not retained anyone by the trial date, but Jones
argued that was not true because he was wrongly denied a public
103
The court ordered
defender based on his girlfriend’s income.
104
Jones to fill out another application for a public defender. Jones
was employed, earning $12 an hour, and his girlfriend was also
105
employed. The application listed their combined gross monthly
106
income as $3784 and expenses as $3592.
The court collector
explained that the reason for denying the application was because
Jones’s income alone, $2280, was greater than 125% of the federal
107
poverty guidelines.
Although the prosecutor asked the court to make a record
108
regarding the waiver of counsel, the court did not obtain a
109
written waiver of Jones’s right to counsel.
The court advised
Jones on the record that he had the right to counsel, that his public
defender applications had been denied four or five times, and that
110
he had not been able to retain counsel.
But the court did not
advise Jones of the nature of the charges, the dangers and

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 508 (Page, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 501 (majority opinion). While the federal poverty guidelines may
create a presumption of eligibility, they cannot be used as the sole basis for cutting
off eligibility because appointment of counsel is based on the court’s
determination of the defendant’s financial ability to pay. State v. Ferris, 540
N.W.2d 891, 894–95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). Justice Page, in his dissent, expressed
concern that the district court did not properly exercise discretion when it denied
Jones’s public defender applications based on the poverty guidelines. Jones, 772
N.W.2d at 508 (Page, J., dissenting).
108. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 502.
109. Id. at 504.
110. Id. at 502.
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disadvantages of self-representation, and Jones objected to
111
Jones represented himself at the
proceeding without counsel.
three-day jury trial and did not have standby or advisory counsel to
112
assist him.
Jones was convicted and sentenced to thirty months in prison
113
for the check forgery conviction.
Jones appealed his conviction
114
The court of appeals
to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Jones’s applications for the public defender and that
Jones waived counsel by his conduct in repeatedly failing to retain
115
counsel. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Jones’s petition
116
for further review on November 25, 2008.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision
1.

No Valid Waiver of Counsel

In a four-three decision, the supreme court affirmed Jones’s
117
convictions. First, the supreme court considered whether Jones’s
waiver of counsel was constitutionally valid. The supreme court
noted that there are three ways in which a defendant may
relinquish the constitutional right to counsel: (1) waiver, (2) waiver
118
by conduct, and (3) forfeiture.
Applying these concepts to
Jones’s case, the supreme court acknowledged that there was no
“attempt by the district court to obtain a written waiver of counsel
119
from Jones” as required by Minnesota law.
The supreme court also found that the on-the-record colloquy
was insufficient because the district court did not advise Jones of
the nature of the charges or the advantages and disadvantages of
111. Id. at 504–05.
112. See id. at 507; see also State v. Clark, 722 N.W.2d 460, 466–67 (Minn. 2006)
(reasoning that there is no state constitutional right to advisory counsel).
113. State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 354.
116. State v. Jones, No. A07-1168, 2008 LEXIS 632, at *1 (Minn. Nov. 25,
2008).
117. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 507.
118. Id. at 504 (citing State v. Pedockie, 137 P.3d 716, 721 (Utah 2006)); see
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099–1102 (3d Cir. 1995) (defining the
concepts of waiver, waiver by conduct, and forfeiture).
119. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504; see also MINN. STAT. § 611.19 (2008) (requiring
defendant waiving counsel to do so in writing); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4)
(requiring written or on-the-record waiver of the right to counsel).
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120

Jones’s decision to waive counsel.
The court also noted that
“[m]ore importantly, Jones objected twice to proceeding without
121
counsel.” Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that, on this
record, the waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and
122
voluntary.
2.

No Waiver by Conduct

Waiver by conduct requires the same colloquy regarding the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation as required for an
123
Further, waiver by conduct only
affirmative waiver of counsel.
“applies to those defendants who voluntarily engage[d] in
124
misconduct knowing what they stand to lose.”
Applying these
principles, the supreme court had no choice but to hold that Jones
did not waive counsel by his conduct because the district court
125
failed to conduct a sufficient, on-the-record colloquy.
3.

Jones Forfeited Counsel by His Dilatory Conduct

Under Goldberg, forfeiture requires “extremely serious” or
126
“extremely dilatory” misconduct. The supreme court determined
that Jones forfeited his right to counsel because he “engaged in
conduct that was extremely dilatory” by refusing to retain counsel
after being given the opportunity to do so on “eight separate
127
occasions.” In making this determination, the supreme court was
persuaded by the following facts: the district court repeatedly
advised Jones to retain counsel, he applied for and was denied the
public defender at least three times, he told the court that he was
planning on retaining private counsel, he was granted three
continuances for the purpose of giving him time to do so, the court
delayed the trial date to give him a chance to retain counsel, and
128
the court warned him he would get no more continuances.

120. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504.
121. Id. at 504–05.
122. Id. at 505.
123. Id.
124. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Goldberg,
67 F.3d 1092, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995)).
125. Id. (citations omitted).
126. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101–02.
127. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 506.
128. Id.
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The Dissent

But in a separate dissent, Justice Meyer, who was joined by
Justice Paul Anderson, disagreed that Jones’s conduct was
“extremely dilatory” so as to constitute forfeiture. First, Justice
Meyer noted that forfeiture usually only applies in “extreme
circumstances,” such as when the defendant verbally or physically
129
Second, Justice Meyer acknowledged that
abuses counsel.
forfeiture might apply in circumstances where a “defendant’s
purposeful manipulation of the judicial system blocks a court’s
130
ability to ensure a sufficient waiver.”
But where the defendant
does not “purposefully abuse the privilege, and the court could
assess the defendant’s awareness of the risks of self-representation,
131
forfeiture should not be applied.”
Justice Meyer also recognized that “[a] very small number of
courts have found misconduct ‘extremely dilatory’ when a
defendant’s actions in obtaining, working with, or changing
132
representation have led to excessive delay or inconvenience.” But
there was no doubt in these cases that the defendants were
purposefully trying to manipulate or delay the proceedings,
because the defendants were being uncooperative and
133
unreasonable.
Jones’s case, on the other hand, “does not show such
purposeful manipulation as to be labeled ‘extremely dilatory
misconduct.’ Jones’s financial situation made it unclear whether he
129. Id. at 513–14 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Leggett, 162
F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325–26 (11th
Cir. 1995); State v. Lehman, 749 N.W.2d 76, 81–82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008)).
130. Id. at 514 (citing Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa.
2009)) (holding that where the unrepresented defendant refuses to engage in the
colloquy process, the defendant cannot be allowed to “clog the machinery of
justice or hamper and delay the state’s efforts to effectively administer justice”).
131. Id. (citing State v. Hampton, 92 P.3d 871, 874–75 (Ariz. 2004) (declining
to find forfeiture, even though the defendant threatened his attorney’s life)).
132. Id. at 514–15 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 257–58 (5th
Cir. 1985); State v. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406, 418–20 (Wis. 1996)). In Mitchell,
the issue on appeal involved the court’s denial of Mitchell’s counsel’s request for a
continuance, but the court analyzed it under waiver of counsel because the denial
of the continuance meant that Mitchell represented himself at trial. Mitchell, 777
F.2d at 258. The court held that the defendant cannot deliberately manipulate his
choice of counsel for the purpose of delaying the trial where the defendant knows
of the trial date and deliberately retains counsel knowing counsel has a conflict
with that date. Id. at 257–58.
133. See Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 257–58; Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 514–15; Cummings,
546 N.W.2d at 418–20.
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would qualify for a public defender, and his applications for such
representation were denied with no clear explanation as to why he
134
did not qualify.”
Finally, Justice Meyer recognized that the
district court never made any findings that Jones’s conduct was
135
“done in bad faith or to purposefully delay the proceedings.” In
fact, the contrary is true because the district court “acknowledged
that Jones was doing what needed to be done, but simply failed to
136
‘finalize’ things.”
For these reasons, the dissent concluded that
137
Jones did not forfeit counsel.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JONES DECISION AND GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE
CASES
A. Analysis
Clearly, Jones did not waive counsel under Faretta or
Minnesota law. Nor did he waive counsel by his conduct because
he was never advised of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation. Left with no other option, the court appears to
have relied on forfeiture to get around the inadequate on-therecord colloquy. But the problem with applying the extreme
sanction of forfeiture to the Jones facts is that, as the dissent
138
recognized, Jones did not engage in any purposeful wrongdoing.
139
He did not make
He did not abuse or threaten counsel.
unreasonable demands of counsel in order to sabotage the
140
attorney-client relationship for purposes of delay. In fact, he was
141
And his conduct in failing to
never represented by counsel.
retain counsel, where the record is not clear that he actually had
134. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 515; see also id. at 508 (Page, J., dissenting) (“Because
the court below failed to make any findings or explain its reasons for denying the
application on the record in any meaningful way, it is impossible to apply an abuse
of discretion standard of review to the court’s denials of these applications.”).
135. Id. at 515 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998); United
States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325–26 (11th Cir. 1995); State v. Lehman, 749
N.W.2d 76, 81–82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
140. Cf. State v. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406, 418–20 (Wis. 1996) (finding
forfeiture where the defendant consistently refused to cooperate and was
unreasonably dissatisfied with each of his three court-appointed attorneys so that
they were allowed to withdraw, leaving him to represent himself).
141. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 501.
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the financial ability to do so, cannot be construed as a deliberate
142
In
attempt to manipulate the proceedings and delay the trial.
fact, the district court actually “acknowledged that Jones was doing
143
what needed to be done . . . .” On this record, Jones’s conduct in
144
failing to retain counsel cannot be construed as forfeiture.
United States Supreme Court precedent does not support the
result reached by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Jones. The
forfeiture cases decided by the Supreme Court have all involved
purposeful wrongdoing or misconduct that is directly responsible
145
for the loss of the constitutional right.
These decisions are also
consistent with the general principle that the defendant cannot
complain about the loss of constitutional rights when his or her
146
own deliberate actions are responsible for the loss.
But these
principles do not apply to the facts of Jones’s case where the record
is not clear that Jones deliberately refused to hire counsel to delay
or manipulate the proceedings, or if he was simply financially
unable to retain counsel.
B. Guidelines
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Jones adopted a framework
for analyzing when a defendant’s behavior is bad enough to forfeit
constitutional rights. Although the framework doesn’t really fit the
facts of Jones’s case, that doesn’t mean it is unworkable. The
concepts of waiver, waiver by conduct, and forfeiture can be
applied, provided the court follows these guidelines:
• A defendant’s waiver of counsel must be explicit and in
147
writing.
142. Cf. United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining
that the defendant’s inability to retain counsel at public expense was a
consequence of his decision to be vague and withhold access to his financial
records); Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 2009) (explaining
that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by failing to retain counsel,
despite having the opportunity and financial ability to do so).
143. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 515.
144. Cf. Gladden v. State, 110 P.3d 1006, 1008–10 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005)
(reversing defendant’s conviction and concluding that the defendant’s conduct in
stubbornly refusing to accept appointed counsel and failing to take the steps
necessary to hire private counsel were not so egregious to constitute forfeiture,
nor could the defendant’s conduct be considered waiver by conduct because the
defendant was not warned of the risks of self-representation).
145. See, e.g., Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2687–88 (2008).
146. See id.; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879).
147. MINN. STAT. § 611.19 (2008); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4).
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• If the waiver of counsel is not in writing, the waiver must be
on the record, include an advisory that complies with
Minnesota law, and include the nature of the charges, the
possible penalties, and the dangers and disadvantages of
148
self-representation.
• If the defendant does not waive counsel in writing or on the
record, but is engaging in manipulative behavior that is
making it difficult for the court to proceed with the trial,
then the court must warn the defendant that the continued
behavior will result in the loss of the constitutional right to
counsel, and the court must warn the defendant of the
149
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
• If the defendant persists in the manipulative conduct and
the defendant has been warned that (1) the continued
behavior will result in self-representation and (2) of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, then the
150
defendant has waived counsel by conduct.
• If the defendant assaults, abuses, or verbally threatens
counsel, no warning is required; the defendant has forfeited
151
the right to counsel.
• If the defendant engages in egregious manipulative
behavior, such as unreasonably discharging appointed or
retained counsel, making unreasonable demands of counsel
that subvert the attorney-client relationship and that cause
counsel to withdraw, or repeatedly refusing to hire counsel
despite a clearly demonstrated financial ability to do so, this
conduct may, in a given case, be sufficiently serious to
152
warrant the sanction of forfeiture.
However, the better
practice is still to conduct a colloquy on the record, warning
the defendant that the behavior will result in selfrepresentation and of the dangers and disadvantages of self153
representation.
148. MINN. STAT. § 611.19; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4); see also Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (discussing the information the defendant
must possess to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel).
149. See United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 2009).
150. See State v. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406, 418–20 (Wis. 1996).
151. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998); United
States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325–26 (11th Cir. 1995); State v. Lehman, 749
N.W.2d 76, 81–82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
152. United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099–1101 (3d Cir. 1995).
153. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although jurisdictions disagree on how badly the defendant
must behave before he or she can be deemed to have forfeited the
right to counsel, under the Goldberg rubric adopted by the
154
Minnesota Supreme Court, Jones’s conduct was not bad enough.
Certainly a defendant who mistreats his or her lawyer by abusive or
155
threatening conduct forfeits the right to counsel.
It is also
apparent that a defendant who deliberately sabotages his or her
relationship with counsel, causing counsel to withdraw, or who has
the financial ability to retain counsel but fails to do so to
purposefully delay the trial can be deemed to have forfeited the
156
These circumstances are consistent with the
right to counsel.
principle that a defendant cannot argue that his constitutional
157
rights are violated when his own conduct leads to the violation.
158
But Jones was never represented by counsel, so he did not forfeit
the right to counsel based on wrongful conduct towards counsel.
And Jones’s conduct in failing to retain counsel cannot be
construed as an attempt to manipulate or delay the trial because it
is not clear that Jones actually had the financial ability to retain
159
counsel.
Therefore, Jones conduct cannot be considered
forfeiture under any definition.

154. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099–01.
155. See Leggett, 162 F.3d at 250; McLeod, 53 F.3d at 325–26; Lehman, 749
N.W.2d at 81–82.
156. See United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 2009).
157. Bauer, 956 F.2d at 695.
158. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Minn. 2009).
159. Id. at 509 (Page, J., dissenting).
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